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Executive Summary
The immense powers of the presidency and the vast array 
of global threats facing the United States make it essential 
to always have a president who is physically and mentally 
capable of discharging the office’s responsibilities. The 25th 
Amendment was designed to protect against the dangers of 
an unable president. The amendment’s Section 4, which to-
date has not been invoked, sets forth the mechanism by which 
the vice president and either the principal officers of executive 
departments or an other body created by legislation can declare 
a president unable to continue discharging the duties of his or 
her office.
But the 25th Amendment does not necessarily shield the nation 
from all harms that an unable president might cause. One of 
the president’s most important responsibilities—the power to 
deploy nuclear weapons—can be exercised unilaterally and 
essentially at a moment’s notice. Current launch procedures 
may not provide enough time for invocation of the 25th 
Amendment.
Reforms are needed to help ensure that the 25th Amendment 
can be invoked when necessary and to diminish the possibility 
that an unable president may misuse the office’s nuclear 
powers. 
This report chronicles the history and text of the 25th 
Amendment and describes recent legislation introduced by 
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate for 
establishing a Section 4 “other body” to conduct presidential 
disability assessments as well as legislation to limit the 
president’s nuclear authority. This report then makes four 
proposals. 
Proposal 1 recommends that Congress create a three-person 
other body composed of the highest-ranking members 
of the current president’s political party in the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, as well as a third individual. 
Suggestions for the third member of the other body include 
a recently retired Supreme Court justice appointed by the 
current president’s political party, the White House chief-of-
staff, and former presidents and vice presidents of the current 
president’s political party. This other body would be established 
by Congress if the vice president certifies that the president 
has dismissed at least one-third of the principal officers of the 
executive departments within 30 days.
Proposal 2 recommends an internal reporting mechanism 
allowing certain high-ranking personnel from the Executive 
Office of the President as well as other individuals, such as 
the first lady and the White House physician, to anonymously 
report observations of possible presidential disability to the 
White House chief-of-staff and White House counsel. If, by 
the joint assessment of the chief-of-staff and counsel, reports 
of presidential disability are sufficiently corroborated, then the 
counsel would have a duty to bring the matter to the attention 
of the vice president, who is the indispensable actor in the 
process of invoking the 25th Amendment’s Section 4. 
Proposal 3 would require the Office of Legal Counsel to develop 
procedures at the start of each presidential administration for 
recording the votes of the participants in a presidential disability 
determination, transmitting the declaration of presidential 
disability to Congress, and for all other legal and technical 
matters related to a Section 4 inability determination. After 
developing these procedures, the Office of Legal Counsel would 
be required to distribute the procedures to all participants in a 
potential presidential disability assessment. 
Finally, Proposal 4 recommends that Congress use its 
appropriations power to require the Department of Defense to 
consult with House and Senate leadership on a regular basis 
about the nation’s nuclear weaponry program. Congress might 
also require the Department of Defense to advise the vice 
president and principal officers of executive departments who 
serve on the National Security Council of any unanticipated 
changes in the nation’s nuclear footing. Such notification could 
lead those officials to invoke the 25th Amendment if an unable 
president attempted to misuse his or her nuclear authorities.
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Introduction
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November 
1963 was the eighth time that a president had died in 
office.1 In addition to the presidents who had not survived 
their tenures, others had suffered serious physical and 
psychological ailments.2 Several of the prior presidential deaths 
and disabilities had triggered discussion of the gaps in the 
Constitution’s procedures for presidential succession, especially 
the absence of a constitutional method for declaring a president 
unable.3 But sufficient momentum for reform never built—until 
the Kennedy assassination. Two months after the assassination, 
Congress held hearings on presidential succession4 and, in a 
year-and-a-half, the proposed 25th Amendment headed to the 
states for ratification, which it received in February 1967.5
The nation had experienced the perils of presidential frailty 
before, but the time in which the Kennedy assassination 
occurred was different. It was the beginning of the nuclear age, 
and the need to always have an able president was greater 
than ever.6 With the Cold War as a backdrop, Congress acted 
quickly to clarify and elaborate on the constitutional provisions 
for presidential succession.7 The 25th Amendment included 
procedures for removing an “unable” president from the 
office’s powers and duties.8 A major purpose behind those 
procedures was ensuring that a capable president was always 
on guard to defend the nation from any threats it might face 
and that a president who had lost his or her capacity could not 
do any harm.9
1 See JARED COHEN, ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENTS: EIGHT MEN WHO CHANGED AMERICA xi 
(2019).
2 See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 918-22; see generally 
Robert E. Gilbert, Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The 
Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (2010). 
3 JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 49-55 (3d ed. 2014).
4 See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964).
5 FEERICK, supra note 3, at 104-05.
6 See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in 
Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (2010).
7 See id. at 963-64.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3-4.
9 See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 964.
This report addresses one of the same challenges the 25th 
Amendment’s framers confronted: protecting against the 
dangers of an unable president. The 25th Amendment provides 
the constitutional mechanism for separating a president from 
his or her powers and duties when necessary. But, as this 
report highlights, action is needed to plan for implementations 
of the amendment. Additionally, there are some scenarios 
where the amendment’s invocation might be impractical, such 
as fast-moving emergencies or situations where the officials 
empowered to invoke the amendment are hesitant to act. These 
scenarios demand reevaluation of the policies that provide the 
president with one of the office’s most consequential powers—
the unilateral authority to launch nuclear weapons. Accordingly, 
in addition to advancing recommendations for the 25th 
Amendment’s implementation, this report also recommends 
reforms designed to prevent undue harm that might result from 
the president’s nuclear powers.
Part I of this report discusses existing constitutional procedures 
for scenarios where the president becomes unable and provides 
an overview of relevant proposed legislation. Part II focuses on 
the provision of the 25th Amendment that allows Congress to 
create an “other body” to act with the vice president to declare 
the president “unable.” This Part ultimately proposes a three-
person “other body” that would serve if a certain number of 
principal officers of the executive departments are dismissed. 
Part III proposes creating a reporting mechanism for Executive 
Office of the President (“EOP”) personnel who have concerns 
about the president’s capacity. Part III also clarifies procedural 
aspects of the 25th Amendment and recommends that the 
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) create procedures for recording 
votes cast under Section 4 of the 25th Amendment to declare 
the president unable, transmitting the disability determination 
to Congress, and resolving legal and technical issues related to 
Section 4. Finally, Part IV focuses on the president’s unfettered 
power to deploy nuclear weapons and proposes that Congress 
utilize budgetary powers to mandate closer coordination 
with the Department of Defense with respect to the nuclear 
arsenal. The final Part also recommends that Congress consider 
requiring the defense secretary to notify the vice president and 
other principal officers of the executive department who sit on 
the National Security Council of any unanticipated changes in 
the nation’s nuclear footing, in case use of the 25th Amendment 
is needed to remove unable president before nuclear weapons 
are deployed.
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This Part begins with a description of the 25th Amendment’s 
provisions. It then discusses the meaning of presidential inability 
and its relation to concerns over the president’s nuclear powers. 
This Part concludes with an overview of recent proposed 
legislation regarding the 25th Amendment’s other body 
provision and the president’s authority to order nuclear launches.
A. The 25th Amendment 
The 25th Amendment addresses what happens when the 
president is unable to discharge the power and duties of his or 
her office, in addition to clarifying the vice president’s status upon 
succession to the presidency and creating a way to fill vacancies in 
the vice presidency. The amendment is made up of four sections. 
Section 1 states the vice president shall become president if 
the president is removed from office, dies, or resigns.10 Some 
interpretations of the Constitution’s original Succession Clause 
had asserted that the vice president became president when he 
acted in place of an unable president, permanently displacing 
the president from the office.11 The prospect of preventing a 
disabled president from returning from office, even if he recovered, 
discouraged some vice presidents from acting in place of disabled 
presidents.12 The 25th Amendment clarified that the vice 
president only becomes presidents in cases where a president 
permanently leaves office due to death, resignation, or removal.
Section 2 allows the president to nominate a vice president 
when there is a vacancy in the office. The president’s nominee 
must receive approval from majorities of both houses of 
Congress.13 This section ensures that the 25th Amendment’s 
inability procedures function as intended; without a vice 
president, those procedures are essentially inoperable.
Section 3 permits the president to voluntarily transfer the 
powers and duties of the presidency to the vice president 
when he or she is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of the presidency.14 Section 4 creates a method for the vice 
president, acting with either the principal officers of the 
executive departments or an other body created by Congress, 
to declare the president unable. The vice president serves as 
acting president following such a declaration, but the president 
can contest the determination, which might result in Congress 
evaluating the president’s capacity.15 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
11 See Feerick, supra note 2, at 918-19.
12 See id. at 919-20.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
B.  Presidential Disability and Nuclear 
Implications
A test for determining whether a president is “unable to 
discharge the powers and duties” of his or her office was 
intentionally left out of the 25th Amendment.16 Although 
the amendment’s legislative record frequently references 
physical and mental ailments,17 its inability procedures are not 
dependent on a medical determination.18 But the amendment’s 
framers did not intend it to be a means of ousting of an 
unpopular president.19
Senator Birch Bayh, one of the principal architects of the 25th 
Amendment, quoted President Dwight Eisenhower to explain 
that “the determination of Presidential disability is really a 
political question.”20 The 25th Amendment leaves that political 
determination to the vice president and either “the principal 
officers of the executive departments” or an “other body” 
created by Congress.21 
The debate around the adoption of the 25th Amendment 
played out against a backdrop of nuclear anxiety.22 As the 
discussions of an American Bar Association Conference on 
Presidential Inability and Succession demonstrated, little 
16 Jeffrey Rosen, The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political 
Question, ATLANTIC, May 23, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-political-question/527703/; 
A Modern Father of Our Constitution: An Interview With Former Senator Birch 
Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 802 (2010) (“So the question that I think you 
have lurking throughout the document is, ‘What’s disability?’”).
17 When the 25th Amendment was being debated by Congress in 1965, 
Senator Birch Bayh, the amendment’s sponsor in the Senate, said 
Section 4 was intended for use when the president is “unable to make or 
communicate his decisions as to his own competency.” 111 CONG. REC. 3282 
(1965); Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential 
Succession, Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations 
for Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 929 
(2017). Representative Richard Poff said inability under Section 4 included 
physical impairments that would inhibit the president’s ability to declare 
himself unable as well as psychological impairments that prevented the 
president from “mak[ing] any rational decision, including particularly the 
decision to stand aside.” Id.
18  A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 16, at 802. 
19 John D. Feerick, Response to Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on Applications and 
Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 41, 55 (2010) 
(“At various times during the debate of 1964 and 1965, it was made clear 
that unpopularity, incompetence, impeachable conduct, poor judgment, 
and laziness do not constitute an ‘inability’ within the meaning of the 
Amendment.”). 
20 Birch Bayh, The White House Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, https://
www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/opinion/the-white-house-safety-net.
html.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
22 See Rebecca C. Lubot, “A Dr. Strangelove Situation”: Nuclear Anxiety, 
Presidential Fallibility, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1175 (2017).
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was perceived as possible to forestall the misuse of nuclear 
weapons by an “insane” president.23 These nuclear fears were 
illustrated during the Watergate scandal.24 As the possibility 
of impeachment grew in 1974, President Richard Nixon was 
drinking heavily and some officials viewed him as unstable.25 
Around the same time, Nixon told reporters, “I can go back 
into my office and pick up the telephone and in 25 minutes 
70 million people will be dead.”26 In the days before Nixon’s 
resignation, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger took the 
constitutionally dubious step of ordering the military to 
disregard orders from the president, including those pertaining 
to the use of nuclear weapons, unless confirmed by him or 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.27 
C. Recent Proposals
Recent legislative proposals have called for reforms related to 
the 25th Amendment’s other body provision and the president’s 
nuclear launch authority.
1.  Oversight Commission on Presidential  
Capacity Act
On April 6, 2017, Democratic Representative Jamie Raskin 
of Maryland proposed the Oversight Commission on 
23 JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
252 (1965) (“there is practically nothing that could be done to meet a 
case where a President suddenly became insane and pulled the ‘nuclear 
trigger.’”).
24 While named for the break-in into Democratic National Committee 
headquarters by men associated with the reelection campaign of President 
Nixon, Watergate has by metonymy come to refer to various illegal and 
clandestine activities undertaken by the administration against political 
opponents spurring congressional inquiry and eventually the resignation of 
President Nixon to avoid impeachment.  
25 See John A. Farrell, The Year Nixon Fell Apart, POLITICO MAG., Mar. 26, 2017, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/john-farrell-nixon-
book-excerpt-214954; Robert D. McFadden, James R. Schlesinger, Willful 
Aide to Three Presidents, Is Dead at 85, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2014, https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/us/politics/james-r-schlesinger-cold-
war-hard-liner-dies-at-85.html.
26 Richard Rhodes, Absolute Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/03/23/books/review/thermonuclear-monarchy-by-
elaine-scarry.html. 
27 McFadden, supra note 25.
Presidential Capacity Act.28 This act proposed an eleven-
member commission to serve as the other body under 
the 25th Amendment’s Section 4. If directed by Congress, 
the commission would carry out a medical examination of 
the president to determine whether a disability exists. The 
proposed commission would be composed of physicians and 
psychiatrists appointed by the majority and minority leaders 
of the House and Senate. Additionally, two members would be 
former high-ranking officials, such as former presidents and 
vice presidents.29 The Oversight Commission on Presidential 
Capacity Act did not pass in the 115th Congress, but it received 
media attention30 and 67 cosponsors.31 
2.  Legislation to Restrict First Use of Nuclear 
Weapons
In January 2019, two proposals were introduced in the 116th 
Congress to restrict the first use of nuclear weapons. The first of 
these two bills was introduced by Representative Ted Lieu (D-
CA) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) and prohibits a first-use 
nuclear strike absent authorization from Congress.32 This bill 
received 57 cosponsors in the House33 and 13 cosponsors in the 
Senate.34 Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Representative 
Adam Smith (D-WA) similarly proposed legislation establishing 
that the United States generally will not use nuclear weapons 
first. This bill received 21 cosponsors in the House and four 
cosponsors in the Senate.35
28 H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. (2017). 
29 Other high-ranking officials include the Secretary of State, Attorney 
General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, or Surgeon 
General.
30 Ashley Killough, Dem Proposes Panel to Remove President if Unfit to Lead, 
CNN (July 3, 2017, 7:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/30/politics/
jamie-raskin-bill-panel-remove-donald-trump/index.html.
31 All co-sponsors were Democrats. See H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. (2017). 
32 All co-sponsors were Democrats or Independents other than 
Representative Walter B. Jones, Jr (R-NC). See H.R. 669, 116th Cong. 
(2019); S. 200, 116th Cong. (2019).
33 H.R. 669, 116th Cong. (2019).
34 S. 200, 116th Cong. (2019).
35 S. 272, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 921, 116th Cong. (2019).
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II. The “Other Body” Under the 25th Amendment’s Section 4
amendment does not specify under what circumstances an other 
body should evaluate the president’s ability, the legislative history 
makes clear that the other body is for when the principal officers 
of the executive departments “for political reasons or otherwise, 
becom[e] a roadblock” to assessing the president’s ability.39
Proposal 1: A Three-Person Other Body Should be 
Created When the President Dismisses More Than 
One-Third of the Principal O!cers of the Executive 
Departments 
Congress should create an other body to make a presidential 
disability determination with the vice president if, within 
30 calendar days after principal officers of the executive 
departments discuss invoking Section 4, the president 
discharges more than one-third of them. A president might take 
such an action to prevent the amendment’s invocation. 
Given the vice president’s integral role in a presidential disability 
assessment, he or she should have the responsibility of certifying 
that the criteria for convening the other body are met. A vice 
president may choose not to certify the existence of these 
requisite conditions if the vice president believes the president 
dismissed one-third or more of the principal officers for good 
cause. For example, between July 19 and July 20, 1979, President 
Jimmy Carter dismissed five Cabinet secretaries to “shake up” his 
administration,40 not to block invocation of the 25th Amendment. 
Once the vice president certifies the dismissal of one-third or 
more of the principal officers within the relevant 30-day period, 
Congress should act to create the other body to displace the 
principal officers of the executive departments as the panel 
for making presidential disability determinations.41 This other 
body would exist until the president who, having formerly been 
39 Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability, 
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 446 (1995).
40 See John Dickerson, What Happened When President Carter Fired Five 
Cabinet Officials, SLATE (Aug. 2, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2017/08/whistlestop-on-carters-cabinet-purge.html; Cabinet 
Officers in the Carter Administration, JIMMY CARTER PRESIDENTIAL LIBR., https://
www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/about_us/cabinet_officers.
41 In period before Congress took this action, the remaining principal officers 
of the executive departments, and any of their successors appointed 
pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2016), 
would serve as the presidential disability review panel together with the 
vice president. 
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment sets forth a protocol for 
transferring power from the president to the vice president in 
situations in which the president is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his or her office but refuses to or cannot 
voluntarily transfer power. Section 4 states:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority36 of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such 
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to 
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties 
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume 
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.37
The 25th Amendment does not set forth who should serve on 
the other body or the circumstances under which a Section 
4 other body should be established. Nor does the 25th 
Amendment specify when Congress should create an other 
body. This omission allows Congress to wait to create an other 
body until circumstances require it. 
Our proposal for an other body seeks to preserve the dignity of 
the presidency and to protect national security by minimizing a 
power void that could incite domestic, social, or financial panic, 
or incentivize opportunistic foreign aggression. The proposal 
aims to provide precise guidelines for restoring certainty 
and stability as quickly as possible in a situation where the 
president’s capacity is called into question. 
The framers of the 25th Amendment designated the principal 
officers of the executive departments38 as the default panel 
to work with the vice president to assess a president’s ability 
to perform his or her duties. Although the language of this 
36 In the April 1965 House of Representatives floor debates, Representative 
Richard Poff (R-VA) proposed that an other body should be convened 
if the principal officers of the executive departments are deadlocked 
in their inability determination. There is no constitutional requirement 
that Congress take any further action if there is a tie vote because a tie 
vote means that there is no majority. There currently are 15 executive 
department heads, making a 50-50 vote unlikely. However, a “tie” could 
occur if (a) one or more principal officers is unavailable or abstains 
from voting or (b) if the number of executive departments changes. 
Representative Poff proposed that, if there is a tie among the executive 
department heads, the other body should be all of the principal officer of 
the executive departments plus one individual to cast a tie-breaking vote. 
See 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
38 The principal officers of the executive departments are often incorrectly 
assumed to be the heads of every Cabinet-level official. The 15 executive 
departments are set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 101. They are the departments of: 
State, the Treasury, Defense, Justice, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, 
Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, 
Transportation, Education, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security. 5 
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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declared disabled by the vice president and the other body, 
reassumes the powers and duties of the presidency.42
The 25th Amendment states that the vice president must 
act with a “majority” of the principal officers of the executive 
departments and implies that the vice president should act with 
a “majority” of the members of  an other body if one is created.43 
Therefore, it would be preferable for the other body to be 
composed of an odd number of members.44 To ensure the other 
body convenes quickly and acts effectively, we propose a three-
person45 other body. This other body should consist of: (1) the 
highest-ranking member of the president’s political party in the 
House of Representatives (presumably either the speaker of the 
House or the minority leader); (2) the highest-ranking member 
of the president’s political party in the Senate (presumably either 
the president pro tempore or minority leader), and (3) another 
member of the president’s political party selected by the vice 
president and the other members of the other body.46 
42 If the president transmits in writing to the president pro tempore of the 
Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives that he or she is 
no longer disabled, the vice president and the other body have four days 
in which to declare that the president continues to be disabled. The other 
body would be disbanded if the vice president and the other body do 
not contest the president’s resumption of his or her presidential powers. 
Retaining the other body as the disability determination panel throughout 
the duration of a president’s inability is desirable because the members 
of the panel would be familiar with the reasons for the initial presidential 
disability determination.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
44 The language of Section 4 of the 25th Amendment clearly states that the 
vice president must act with a “majority” of the principal officers of the 
executive departments. However, because of the manner in which Section 
4 is punctuated, it is unclear whether the amendment also requires a 
majority of the members of the other body to join with the vice president 
for purposes of declaring a presidential inability. See John D. Feerick, The 
25th Amendment: Its Crafting and Drafting Process, 2018-2019 CONLAWNOW 
161, 172. Dean Feerick raises a question as to whether, because commas 
setting off the other body provision were dropped without explanation from 
the final text of the amendment, the “majority” requirement in Section 4 
applies only to the principal officers of the executive departments. Id.
45 In its “Reader’s Guide” to the 25th Amendment, Yale Law School’s Rule of 
Law Clinic notes that the dictionary meaning of the word “body” implies 
that a body of persons consist of more than one individual and that this 
interpretation of the word body is supported by the requirement that a 
majority of the other body find a presidential disability in order to trigger 
Section 4. See YALE LAW SCH. RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE 17 (2018). We propose 
that the other body be made up of three people. If the majority requirement 
ultimately is held to apply to the other body, the other body should be 
composed of an odd number of individuals so there is an affirmative 
decision and votes do not fail simply because there is a tie. If the other 
body is convened, the nation will likely be in a period of crisis and having a 
small number of other body members would make it more likely to reach 
a decision expeditiously. The other body should consist of more than one 
individual and three is the smallest odd number greater than one.
46 If for any reason, the vice president and the two members of the other body 
fail to agree upon a third member within 48 hours of first convening, the 
other body could proceed by unanimous vote of the vice president and the 
two other body members. 
The other body should be made up of members of the 
president’s political party for two primary reasons. First, they 
presumably have some loyalty to the president and are less 
likely to improperly invoke Section 4 for partisan benefit. 
Second, composing the other body of officials who share the 
president’s political affiliation is in keeping with the selection 
of the principal officers of the executive departments as the 
primary evaluation group under the amendment.
Three possible third members of an other body include 
the most recently retired Supreme Court justice who was 
nominated by a president of the current president’s political 
party, the White House chief-of-staff, or former presidents 
or vice presidents of the current president’s political party. 
A retired Supreme Court justice who was nominated by a 
president of the current president’s party could be an ideal 
other body member because he or she would likely be able to 
make a non-partisan inability determination. Furthermore, a 
retired justice would also understand the proper parameters for 
invoking the 25th Amendment and the political implications of 
an inability determination.
But there are drawbacks to involving members of the Court. 
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger told the University of 
Virginia’s Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability 
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that sitting justices should 
not be involved in a 25th Amendment inability determination 
in case the Supreme Court was called to rule on an application 
of the 25th Amendment.47 A retired justice would not be called 
to rule an application of the 25th Amendment. However, even a 
retired Supreme Court Justice might not be willing to participate 
in a Section 4 inability determination because he or she may 
feel that participation in an inability determination could 
somehow bias the decision-making of the sitting Supreme 
Court. A retired justice may also decline to vote on a disability 
determination due to lack of regular contact with the current 
president, which could be helpful to assess changes in the 
president’s behavior.
The chief-of-staff presumably works with the president on 
a daily basis and would thus be able to assess whether the 
president was exhibiting signs of cognitive impairment. 
Additionally, the chief-of-staff would most likely be a member 
of the president’s political party and be loyal to the president. 
However, because the chief-of-staff serves at the pleasure of 
the president, a president who has already discharged one-
47 MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY 
AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 9 (1988), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=twentyfifth_amendment_
reports.
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third of the principal officers of the executive departments 
who participated in an inability determination might well also 
dismiss a chief-of-staff for the same reason.
Finally, former presidents and vice presidents of the current 
president’s political party are strong candidates for an other 
body because they are familiar with the demands of the 
presidency as well as the political implications of making an 
inability determination. However, a former president or vice 
president may have little, if any, regular contact with the current 
president. Additionally, former presidents and vice presidents 
may not wish to risk their legacies by becoming involved in a 
contentious matter.
The principal officers of the executive departments are part of 
the same branch of government as the president. The framers 
of the 25th Amendment included them in Section 4 to preserve 
the separation of powers.48 However, if their ability to determine 
presidential inability with the vice president is compromised, as 
it would be if the president fired one-third or more of them, then 
the involvement of other branches of government is necessary.
The advantage of having congressional leaders on the other 
body is four-fold. First, if the issue at hand is a psychological 
illness, congressional leaders would be as familiar with the 
president’s personality and mannerisms as most principal 
officers of the executive departments. This familiarity would 
let them make personal observations about changes in the 
president’s behavior. Second, congressional leaders would be 
extremely sensitive to the political implications of a disability 
determination. Third, if the president could not convince these 
congressional leaders that he or she was able to perform the 
duties of the office, then the chances of successfully appealing 
his or her case to the entirety of Congress is low. Finally, the 
other body must be created by Congress “by law.”49 Therefore, 
any bill establishing this other body is subject to a presidential 
veto, absent an override by Congress. A president is more 
likely to sign a bill delegating authority to make a disability 
determination to members of Congress from his or her 
political party.
Even though Congress should not create an other body before 
a presidential inability scenario arises, lawmakers should 
develop a conception of what officials would be part of the 
other body beforehand. It would be inauspicious for Congress 
to spend time debating the composition of an other body when 
48 See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 987-88.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
a disability determination is needed. The legislative history of 
Section 4 suggests that the amendment’s framers anticipated 
that any legislation creating an other body would be enacted 
when that other body was required to make an inability 
determination.50 For example, in the Senate floor debates on 
the 25th Amendment, Senator Bayh indicated that an other 
body might be created where the vice president fails to obtain 
a majority vote of the principal officers but still believes the 
president is unfit to carry out his or her official duties.51 At such 
a time, the president would be either unable or disinclined to 
sign into law legislation creating an other body. Because it is 
unlikely that the president would sign any such legislation, the 
unsigned bill would not become law for ten days (excluding 
Sundays) if the president did not affirmatively veto the bill 
sooner, assuming Congress remained in session for the ten 
days.52 More likely, the president would veto the legislation, and 
Congress would then have to collectively override a presidential 
veto with a two-thirds vote of each house of Congress.53 Given 
the political controversy inherent in a presidential disability 
determination, creating additional dissension would not serve 
the best interests of the nation.
It might seem desirable to pass legislation setting forth who 
would serve on an other body before the need arises. However, 
having an other body in existence that will not make a disability 
determination until a contingency occurs might lead to 
confusion about the process of invoking the 25th Amendment. 
Furthermore, allowing an other body to be created by Congress 
at the time when a president’s ability is called into question 
would allow Congress to make a definitive determination on the 
composition of the other body. For example, former presidents 
from the current president’s political party might be suitable 
members of the other body; however, at the time of a disability 
determination, there may not be individuals who are living, able, 
and willing to serve in that capacity. 
To preserve the dignity of the presidency and the safety and 
prestige of the United States, it is essential that, if a president’s 
fitness to lead is called into question, proceedings to evaluate 
his or her ability be conducted respectfully and responsibly. 
This proposal aligns with the intent of the 25th Amendment 
and ensures the efficiency in what is likely to be a tense and 
uncertain time. 
50 111 CONG. REC. 15,384 (1965).
51 Id. at 15,383. 
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
53 Id.
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III. Section 4 Procedure and Reporting Mechanisms
Proposal 2: Create a Reporting Mechanism for 
Executive O!ce of the President Personnel
EOP personnel may play an important role in assessing 
presidential disability because of their continuous interaction 
and communication with the president.56 The EOP includes 
many of the president’s closest advisers in matters of policy, 
politics, and management.57 Thus, EOP personnel can directly 
observe possible manifestations of presidential disability and 
assess whether the president is “unable to discharge the duties 
of his office.”58 However, concerns about job security and 
intense loyalty to a president may hinder serious discussions 
about president’s capacity.59 
An internal reporting mechanism should be created to ensure 
personal loyalty and job security concerns do not inhibit EOP 
staff from raising serious concerns about a president’s ability 
to discharge the office’s responsibilities.60 The reporting 
mechanism should provide confidentiality and protection 
from reprisal. The mechanism should allow personnel from 
the EOP who have been designated either assistant to the 
president, special assistant to the president, or deputy 
assistant to the president to report observations of possible 
presidential disability.61 Those reports should then be brought 
to the attention of the chief-of-staff and White House counsel. 
The reporting mechanism should also be open to select 
persons who are not part of the EOP, or who do not possess 
the above-listed designations but are in a unique position 
to observe the manifestation of a disability, such as the first 
lady and the White House physician.62 The chief-of-staff 
and counsel should be tasked with jointly determining if the 
disability report is sufficiently corroborated by other reports, 
56 See id.; A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 16, at 795.
57 See Executive Office of the President, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/
executive-office-of-the-president (last visited July 24, 2019).
58 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
59 See MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 8.
60 JANE MAYER & DOYLE MCMANUS, LANDSLIDE: THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT viii-x 
(1988). In 1987, concerns about President Reagan’s mental acuity were 
uncovered when Jim Cannon, an aide to newly appointed Chief-of-Staff 
Howard Baker, interviewed White House staffers in private and gave them 
assurances of confidentiality. Id.
61 The three EOP designations specified in the proposal are representations 
of staff rank within the EOP and do not necessarily correspond with a 
staffer’s job title. Senior-level staff are designated assistant to the president, 
second-level staff are designated deputy assistant to the president, and 
third-level staff are designated as special assistant to the president. 
See Martha Joynt Kumar, Assistants to the President at 18 Months: White 
House Turnover Among the Highest Ranking Staff and Positions, WHITE HOUSE 
TRANSITION PROJECT, at 4 (2018), http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Kumar_Assistants_to_the_President_
Turnover_10-02-2018.pdf.
62 See MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 10-11.
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment makes the vice president 
the indispensable participant in its procedure for removing 
an “unable” president from the office’s powers and duties.54 
Yet there is no publicly known process or mechanism to bring 
concerns about a president being “unable to discharge the 
duties of his office” to the vice president’s attention. It is also 
unclear whether detailed procedures are in place for how 
the vice president and the principal officers of the executive 
departments or other body should utilize Section 4. Given the 
provision’s complexity, guidance on how to properly use it is 
essential. Further, the intense loyalty staff members feel toward 
a president may prevent serious concerns about presidential 
disability from being raised.55 With these realties in mind, the 
proposals in this section aim to create a set of processes to 
bring concerns about presidential disability to the attention 
of the vice president and to resolve uncertainties related to 
Section 4 procedures. 
Proposal 2, the first proposal discussed in this section, would 
create a reporting mechanism to allow specific personnel 
from the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) to report 
observations of possible presidential disability to the White 
House chief-of-staff and White House counsel. If the chief-of-
staff and the counsel agree that reports of presidential disability 
are sufficiently corroborated, then the counsel would have a 
duty to bring the matter to the attention of the vice president. 
Proposal 3 requires the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) to 
develop procedures for recording the votes of the participants 
in a presidential disability determination, transmitting the 
declaration of presidential disability to Congress, and for any 
other legal and technical matters related to Section 4. After 
developing these procedures, the OLC would be required to 
distribute the procedures to all of the constitutional participants 
named in the 25th Amendment: the president, the vice 
president, the principal officers of the executive departments 
or other body, the speaker of House, and the president pro 
tempore of the Senate.
54 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R45394, PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY UNDER THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2018); Joel K. 
Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power 
of Reciprocal Relationships in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 195 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
55 MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 8.
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personal observations, or other information. If sufficiently 
corroborated, the counsel should then have a duty to report the 
matter to the vice president.63 The counsel and chief-of-staff 
should also bring the matter to the attention of the president 
if they reasonably believe that the president would consider 
voluntarily transferring power by activating Section 3 of the 
25th Amendment until the alleged disability has dissipated or 
been resolved.64 After receiving a report of disability from the 
counsel, the vice president may convene the principal officers 
of the executive departments or other body to determine what 
next steps should be taken.65
The reporting mechanism should not be open to persons who 
will later vote to answer the question of whether the president 
is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.” 
Because the vice president, principal officers of the executive 
departments, or other body members will assess whether a 
disability has rendered the president “unable,” special care 
must be taken to maintain their objectivity and independent 
judgment.66  In limiting the use of the reporting mechanism to 
persons who are not a part of the line of succession, concerns 
over “endless mischief” stemming from the actions of a 
vice president or specific principal officers of the executive 
departments or other body members would be partially 
dispelled.67 
Proposal 3: Requiring the O!ce of Legal Counsel 
to Establish Procedures to Record the Votes of 
Participating Constitutional Actors, Transmit the 
Written Declaration of Disability to Congress, and 
Resolve All Other Legal and Technical Matters 
Related to Section 4. 
63 It is important to note that Office of White House Counsel is not a 
statutorily created or recognized entity and does not have any statutorily 
defined duties. The White House counsel however, is constrained by 
professional ethical obligations which require him or her to act in the 
interest of the institution of the presidency, which may be different from the 
interests of a sitting president. See generally Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s 
Side: the Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1993). 
64 OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, CONTINGENCY PLANS—DEATH OR 
DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 7 (Mar. 16, 1993), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials/10 (stating that “a Section 3 
transfer of authority is much more preferable to a Section 4 transfer”).
65 The vice president may also decide to discuss the possibility of invoking 
Section 3 of the 25th Amendment with the president.
66 A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 16, at 795. 
67 See MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 10 (The Miller Commission 
stated that “it makes good political and common sense to try to relieve 
the Vice President the ambivalence that results from having to initiate the 
process leading to his or her own self-promotion to the highest office in the 
land.”); see NEALE, supra note 54, at 11.
At the start of each presidential administration, the OLC 
should be charged with establishing procedures and clarifying 
ambiguities related to all legal and technical aspects of 
activating Section 4. Because the OLC is responsible for 
providing opinions to the executive branch on constitutional 
matters, it is already empowered to research and opine on 
ambiguous and difficult questions of law related to Section 4.68 
The OLC has established procedures to guide the conduct of 
executive officials.69 Further, no one within the OLC is in the 
line of succession, nor would anyone in the OLC participate in 
a presidential disability determination. Therefore, OLC’s input 
is unlikely to raise concerns relating to conflicts of interest or 
political motivations of OLC attorneys. This last point may 
be especially important in conveying a sense of procedural 
legitimacy to the public in two key areas: recording the votes 
of the Section 4 participants and transmitting a declaration of 
presidential disability to Congress.70 
The 25th Amendment’s text does not elaborate on how the vice 
president and the “principal officers” or other body should cast 
their votes on a potential presidential inability or transmit an 
inability declaration to the president pro tempore of the Senate 
and the speaker of the House.71 The OLC should draw on the 
amendment’s legislative history and any other relevant legal 
and practical considerations to develop detailed procedures. 
Because of the unique circumstances that would surround a 
Section 4 disability determination vote, it is unclear whether the 
voting and transmittal procedures used by other executive or 
legislative committees would be appropriate. Further, it would 
likely undermine public confidence in the process of declaring 
a president disabled if rules related to voting and transmittal 
were determined in an ad hoc manner. Allowing the OLC to 
68 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2016). Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the president and 
the principal officers of the executive departments may request written 
opinions to questions of law from the attorney general. See Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-513 
(2012)). The authority has been delegated to several entities since 1933 
and the OLC was ultimately vested with this power in 1953. See Att’y Gen. 
Order No. 9-53 (Apr. 3, 1953); see generally Foreword, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp., at 
vii (2013) (documenting the organizational origins of OLC).
69 For example, during the Carter administration, the OLC “assumed a 
singular, centralizing role in intelligence oversight. The Office ‘played 
a major role’ in drafting President Carter’s executive order governing 
intelligence activities. The order gave the Attorney General Griffin B. 
Bell responsibility for oversight and regulation of executive intelligence 
activities, and the OLC both served as his ‘principal legal adviser’ and also 
had ‘primary responsibility for coordinating the drafting of the procedures 
as well as for their effective implementation.’” Daphna Renan, The Law 
Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 822 (2017).
70 After Watergate and other scandals of the 1970s, President Carter and 
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, relied in the institutions of formal legal 
review at the OLC to rebuild public confidence. Renan, supra note 69, at 904.
71 See OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 64, at 126.
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develop procedures that specify how the votes of the Section 
4 participants are to be recorded and how the declaration of 
presidential disability is to be transmitted to Congress will 
compel those participating in a Section 4 determination to 
follow a pre-determined process. Once developed, the OLC 
procedures should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised at the 
beginning of each presidential administration.
There are some ambiguities in Section 4, most of which 
can be clarified by referring to the amendment’s legislative 
history and, where necessary, taking clear positions on issues 
where there are conflicting statements in the legislative 
history.72 For example, whether the vice president continues as 
acting president during the four days after the president has 
transmitted to Congress his or her written declaration that no 
inability exists73 and what constitutes receipt of the president’s 
written declaration to commence the 21-day period within 
which Congress must decide on the president’s contested 
disability.74 Given its responsibility to provide legal advice to the 
executive branch on all constitutional questions, the OLC can 
provide immediate clarity at the start of a new administration 
and avoid some of the public uncertainty might develop during 
Section 4 proceedings. 
Some may assert that this proposal will exacerbate 
72 Fred F. Fielding, An Eyewitness Account of Executive “Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 823, 833 (2010). 
73 See NEALE, supra note 54, at 14-15; OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 64, at 22.
74 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 64, at 21.
opportunities for “endless mischief” by inserting individuals 
who do not participate in a Section 4 determination into the 
process of declaring a president disabled. History, however, 
indicates that individuals who are not part of the Section 
4 decision-making process have played significant roles in 
matters related to presidential disability.75 This appears to 
be especially true when administrations have undertaken 
contingency planning.76
This proposal does not advocate for the OLC to implement 
the mechanisms specified in Section 4. Instead, this proposal 
calls for the OLC to clarify textual ambiguities and specify what 
procedures should be followed if the mechanisms of Section 
4 were activated. Once procedures related to the legal and 
technical aspects of activating Section 4 have been established, 
the OLC would be required to disseminate the procedures, 
at a minimum, to all relevant constitutional actors, the White 
House chief-of-staff, and other high-level EOP staff. The OLC’s 
clarification and procedures will, therefore, make it more 
difficult for any actor to create “mischief” under Section 4.
75 See Fielding, supra note 72, at 830. In 1985, White House Counsel Fred 
Fielding convinced President Reagan to follow the procedures of Section 
3 of the 25th Amendment before he underwent cancer surgery. After the 
surgery, Fielding, the chief-of-staff, and the press secretary decided to 
test whether Reagan was lucid enough to resume the powers of his office 
by having him read a letter. In responding to criticisms that Fielding, as a 
non-constitutional actor, inappropriately inserted himself into the process, 
Fielding has said “presidential declaration that he or she is fit . . . will never, 
in any real sense, stand alone . . . the role of any presidential adviser, on 
this or other issues, is to evaluate the circumstances for the President and 
provide your judgment and your recommendation to the President.” Id. at 
830-32.
76 Id.; see generally NEALE, supra note 54.
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IV. The President’s Nuclear Authority
to an impending or successful attack against U.S. assets, he 
or she confers with senior military and civilian leadership.82 
If initiated in response to an imminent or successful attack, 
such consultation may last mere minutes.83 If the president 
determines to proceed, he or she will authenticate the order 
using the “biscuit,” a laminated card with challenge code 
responses kept in the “nuclear football.”84 Once confirmed, the 
orders are transmitted to launch crews around the world who 
authenticate the order and prepare the missiles for launch.85 
This process takes as few as five minutes for land-based 
ordinance and 15 for launches from submarines.86 
The requirement for final authentication by the launch crews is 
meant to assure the legality of any order by including principles 
of “military necessity, distinction and proportionality.”87 
However, questions persist regarding whether the present 
procedure is sufficiently cumbersome to preclude imprudent 
launches88 and whether relying on ad hoc disobedience, which 
is “both unreliable and fraught with constitutional and policy 
implications,” is the appropriate solution.89
B. War Powers
Congress’s ability to curtail the president’s authority to utilize 
nuclear weapons, whether in particular circumstances or 
pursuant to particular procedures, is predicated upon a 
contested interpretation of the president’s war powers. The 
president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.90 
However, Congress possesses the authority to declare war and 
“make rules for the government and regulation of the land and 
naval forces.”91 Congress has repeatedly utilized these powers 
to define many aspects of the military, including size and 
82 Bruce Blair, Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority, 
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 7-8.
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 8; Michael Dobbs, The Real Story of the “Football” That Follows 
the President Everywhere, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Oct. 2014, https://www.
smithsonianmag.com/history/real-story-football-follows-president-
everywhere-180952779/. The nuclear football is carried by a military aide 
who accompanies the president at all times. Id.
85 Blair, supra note 82, at 8.
86 Id.
87 See Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of General C. 
Robert Kehler).
88 Betts & Waxman, supra note 78, at 120 (“[A]lthough common sense and 
careful official planning dictate a process to prevent an imprudent and 
impulsive president from starting a nuclear war, there is nothing stopping a 
determined president from overriding it.”).
89 Id. at 122.
90 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment sought to address the 
fundamental question of how to prevent an unable president 
from exercising the most critical powers of the office—including 
the authority to launch nuclear weapons. During the Cold 
War, the president’s power to act in emergencies or to repel 
invasion77 was deemed superior to congressional authority 
to select warfare prerogatives.78 However, a rebalancing is 
now warranted. As the Arms Control Association79 warned in 
2017, “Continuing to vest such destructive power in the hands 
of one person is undemocratic, irresponsible, unnecessary 
and increasingly untenable.”80 This Part evaluates a series of 
proposals over the past 40 years for constraining presidential 
authority to utilize nuclear weapons in particular circumstances. 
These proposals may sufficiently elongate launch processes to 
enable triggering constitutional protections, including the 25th 
Amendment, in cases of presidential instability. However, each 
proposal presents unresolved constitutional questions regarding 
the division of war powers that undermine their capacity to 
structurally reform present procedures. This Part, therefore, 
proposes Congress leverage its spending power to (1) require 
more close consultation between the Department of Defense 
and congressional leadership and (2) ensure the vice president 
and the principal officers of the executive departments on the 
National Security Council are kept apprised of any unanticipated 
changes in the nation’s nuclear footing for scenarios where 
invocation of the 25th Amendment may be needed.
A. Nuclear Launch Procedures
While specific nuclear launch procedures are highly-classified,81 
the basic contours for presidential authorization of a nuclear 
launch are well-known. When the president decides to consider 
launching a nuclear strike, whether preemptive or in response 
77 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
78 Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb, 97 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 119, 127 (2018) (“In the past, the enormous stakes of nuclear 
decision-making were used to justify expanded presidential powers, 
but today, the better argument is that the special challenges of nuclear 
decisions justify giving Congress some authority to regulate them.”).
79 A nonpartisan membership organization founded in 1971, with the self-
stated mission of “promoting public understanding of and support for 
effective arms control policies.”
80 Daryl G. Kimball & Kingston Reif, Time To Revise Nuclear Launch Policy, 
HILL (Nov. 13, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/
foreign-policy/360055-time-to-revise-nuclear-launch-policy; see also 
Editorial: No One Should Have Sole Authority to Launch a Nuclear Attack, SCI. 
AMERICAN, Aug. 1, 2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/no-
one-should-have-sole-authority-to-launch-a-nuclear-attack/.
81 See Joseph Trevichik, Here’s America’s Plan for Nuking its Enemies, Including 
North Korea, DRIVE, Apr. 17, 2017, http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-
zone/9056/heres-americas-plan-for-nuking-its-enemies-including-north-
korea (analyzing a redacted copy of present nuclear plans).
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armaments.92 In 1973, over the veto of President Nixon, Congress 
adopted the War Powers Resolution, curtailing the executive 
branch’s authority to commit forces to armed conflict absent 
congressional authorization or certain exigent circumstances.93 
In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report approving 
the bill, Chairman J. William Fulbright wrote, “I concur wholly 
. . .  that Congress must retain control over the conventional or 
nuclear character of a war.”94 Fulbright subsequently offered an 
amendment to the legislation providing that, except in a declared 
war or “in response to a nuclear attack or irrevocable launch of 
nuclear weapons, the President may not use nuclear weapons 
without the prior, explicit authorization of the Congress.”95 The 
majority of the debate on the amendment addressed whether 
the resolution was the appropriate venue for resolving concerns 
over nuclear powers,96 though some senators also expressed 
concern over the provision’s constitutionality.97 The amendment 
was defeated 68-10.98 Since then, some have argued that 
Congress has explicitly99 or through inaction100 condoned 
unilateral presidential power in the nuclear arena, though any 
such delegations would be revocable.
One factor in the continued debate over inherent presidential 
authority to utilize nuclear weaponry without congressional 
92 See A General Military Law, 10 U.S.C. subtit. A (governing procurement, 
organization, powers and personnel); Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Program, 50 U.S.C. ch. 32 (regulating chemical and biological warfare 
program).
93 War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548).
94 Jeremy Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, 56 FOREIGN POL’Y 94, 100 
(1984).
95 Id. at 100-01.
96 See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 12,453 (1972) (statement of Sen. Eagleton) (“this 
bill is not the proper vehicle for restricting the President’s use of weapons 
previously appropriated by Congress to the executive arsenal. . . .”); id. at 
12,451 (statement of Sen. Javits) (“I do not believe that this is the time or 
the place to make the decision that we will not use a nuclear weapon under 
any circumstances[.]”).
97 Id. at 12,451 (statement of Sen. Javits) (“I have deep concern, and I am not 
trying to conclude the question, as to whether the President of the United 
States with his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief can be 
prevented from using a nuclear weapon in our arsenal in defense of the 
United States or in defense of the Armed Forces of the United States.”); 
id. at 12,454 (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“I do not think that writing this 
language into a statute can in any way limit the constitutional authority of 
the President to use nuclear weapons if he thought it necessary to protect 
the existence of our country. We cannot by statute deny the constitutional 
power of the President.”).
98 Stone, supra note 94, at 101.
99 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 delegated to the president the authority 
to “direct the [Atomic Energy] Commission to deliver such quantities of 
special nuclear material or atomic weapons to the Department of Defense 
for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense.” 
Authority of Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 2121(b).
100 See Peter Raven-Hansen, Nuclear War Powers, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 786, 791 
(1989).
approval is the absence of consensus regarding whether nuclear 
weapons are improperly classified as conventional weapons. For 
example, many concur with President Truman’s assertion that a 
nuclear weapon “isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out 
women and children and unarmed people, and not for military 
uses. So we have got to treat [nuclear weapons] differently 
from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.”101 Others, 
such as Senator Barry Goldwater, advocate for arming infantry-
men with tactical nuclear weapons under the belief that they 
are conventional weapons.102 
C. Prior Proposals
Proposals to amend nuclear launch authority have fallen into 
three categories: consultation, approval, and prohibition. In 
1975, the first major proposal after the unsuccessful Fulbright 
amendment was offered by the Federation of American 
Scientists (“FAS”). The FAS proposed that in all conflicts, 
with no exceptions, “so long as no nuclear weapons (or other 
weapons of mass destruction103) have been used by others, the 
President shall not use nuclear weapons without consulting 
with, and securing the assent of a majority of, a committee”104 
of Congress.105 The proposal received significant attention 
101 See ROBERT H. FERRELL, HARRY S. TRUMAN: A LIFE 344 (1994); see also Yonkel 
Goldstein, Note, The Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the 
Nuclear Age: The Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1543, 1577 (1988).
102 Nation: The Fear and the Facts, TIME, Sept. 25, 1964. Such a distinction has 
been dismissed by former Defense Secretary James Mattis. Aaron Mehta, 
Mattis: No Such Thing as a ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapon, But New Cruise Missile 
Needed, DEFENSE NEWS, Feb. 6, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/
space/2018/02/06/mattis-no-such-thing-as-a-tactical-nuclear-weapon-
but-new-cruise-missile-needed/; see Stephen L. Carter, War Making Under 
the Constitution and the First Use of Nuclear Weapons, in FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHO DECIDES? 109, 119 (Peter Raven-
Hansen ed., 1987) (arguing that no constitutional analysis can distinguish a 
nuclear weapon from a conventional one).
103 No treaty or customary international law provides an authoritative definition 
for weapons of mass destructions, but the Department of Defense define 
them as “[c]hemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable 
of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding 
the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means 
is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.” DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD 
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 232 (2019), https://www.jcs.
mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
104 The committee would consist of the president pro tempore of the Senate 
and speaker of the House of Representatives, majority and minority 
leaders of the House of Representatives, majority and minority leaders 
of the Senate, chairmen and ranking minority members of the (1) Senate 
Committee on Armed Services; (2) House Committee on Armed Services; 
(3) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; (4) House Committee on 
International Relations; and (5) Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (now 
defunct).
105 William C. Banks, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: The Constitutional Role of a 
Congressional Leadership Committee, 13 J. of LEG. 1, 3 (1986).
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and review over the subsequent decades.106 However, it was 
criticized based on its limited scope, concerns about difficulties 
defining “covered launches,”107 and debates over whether it 
constituted a legislative veto prohibited by INS v. Chadha.108 
Noted constitutional law professor and commentator, Arthur 
S. Miller, rejected the FAS proposal and instead advocated for 
reviving legislative proposals requiring the president to consult 
with a congressionally created “Council of State.”109 Other 
proposals call for constitutional amendments to resolve the 
underlying war powers controversy.110
In recent years, three approaches have been identified as 
potential methods for checking presidential action in the 
nuclear arena. First, congressional action could prohibit the first 
use of nuclear weapons. Two bills prohibiting such first use have 
been introduced in the 116th Congress.111 The first bill discusses 
presidential war powers,112 while the latter bill contains only one 
sentence that states, “It is the policy of the United States to not 
106 See generally FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO 
DECIDES? (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987).
107 Goldstein, Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the Nuclear 
Age, supra note 101, at 1583.
108 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding one house legislative veto violated separation 
of powers). Proponents of FAS proposal distinguished it as not revoking 
executive authority but extending it and argued that Chadha did not 
apply in the foreign policy arena where powers were shared. Allan Ides, 
Congressional Authority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 3 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 233 (1985); William C. Banks, First Use of Nuclear Weapons: 
The Constitutional Role of a Congressional Leadership Committee, 13 J. LEGIS. 1 
(1986); see also Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 459 (D.C Cir. 1982), aff’d mem sub nom. Process 
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S 1216 
(1983) (“[T]he foreign affairs veto presents unique problems since in that 
context there is the additional question whether Congress or the President 
or both have the inherent power to act.”).
109 See Arthur S. Miller & H. Bart Cox, Congress, the Constitution, and First Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 48 REV. OF POL. 424 (1986).
110 Goldstein, Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the Nuclear 
Age, supra note 101, at 1544 (“The proposed amendment would both (1) 
clearly establish congressional authority to set policy in all matters relating 
to the preparation and execution of war, hostilities, aggression, or defense 
of the United States, American citizens, and American interests, and (2) 
establish a private right of action against Congress for its failure to make 
diligent efforts to ascertain the relevant facts, to debate, and to set policy 
in this area.”); see also Ray Forrester, Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An 
Unresolved Problem, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1636, 1639 (1989).
111 Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2019, H.R. 669/S. 200, 
116th Cong. (2019). Some contend that “whether Congress likes it or not, it 
must be involved in any [] decision” to order first use of nuclear weapons 
since “it is [otherwise] unconstitutional, in the absence of a declaration of 
war.” Jeremy Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, 56 FOREIGN POL’Y 94, 
95 (1984). Peter Raven-Hansen argues that the non-delegation doctrine 
requires Congress to make the choice of first-use policy but “cannot make 
it in advance of the event because that would give the President a blank 
check to declare war.” Raven-Hansen, supra note 100, at 791.
112 Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2019, H.R. 669, 116th 
Cong. (2019).
use nuclear weapons first.”113 This approach has received some 
criticism, including from Bruce Blair, who cites the potential 
of inextricably tying the president’s hands in the case of an 
“imminent and seemingly irrevocable nuclear strike,” especially 
given how long it might take to secure congressional approval.114 
Blair also cautions that a unilateral bad decision remains 
possible if a conflict lengthens or shifts after Congress grants 
authority for nuclear launch.115 The legislation has also been 
attacked by Republican Senator Deb Fischer of Nebraska, the 
chairwoman of the Armed Services Committee Subcommittee 
on Strategic Forces. Fischer stated the proposed legislation 
“betrays a naïve and disturbed world view” since “Presidents 
from both parties, including the Obama administration, have 
rejected a no-first-use policy because it erodes deterrence, 
undermines allied confidence in US security guarantees, and 
risks emboldening potential adversaries.”116 
A second avenue includes proposals that seek to bolster or 
supplement aspects of the 25th Amendment. These proposals 
include procedures that would require other officials to be 
advised of a possible nuclear launch and provide approval. 
Richard K. Betts117 and Matthew C. Waxman,118 in a joint paper 
supporting these proposals, stated: “any presidential order to 
launch nuclear weapons that is not in response to an enemy 
nuclear attack should require the concurrence of the Secretary 
of Defense and the Attorney General.”119 While recognizing that 
this proposal may merely “[l]engthen[] the time in which an 
irrational launch order could be held up,” Betts and Waxman 
suggest it would “buy time for the most extreme solution” 
of determining a president disabled pursuant to the 25th 
Amendment.120
113 H.R. 921, 116th Cong. (2019).
114 Blair, supra note 82, at 10.
115 Id.
116 Ryan Browne, Warren introduces bill to stop US using nuclear weapons first, 
CNN (Jan. 30, 2019, 7:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/30/
politics/warren-adam-smith-nuclear-weapons/index.html. President 
Barack Obama had considered declaring a “no first use” policy for nuclear 
weapons in the final year of his administration but was deterred by 
opposition from Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense 
Ash Carter. Ankit Panda, ‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (July 17, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-
and-nuclear-weapons.
117 Director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia 
University and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
118 Liviu Librescu Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and an Adjunct 
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
119 Betts & Waxman, supra note 78, at 120; see also Kimball & Kingston, supra 
note 80.
120 Betts & Waxman, supra note 78, at 125.
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Finally, another proposal would designate the next two 
people in the presidential line of succession—ordinarily, the 
vice president and speaker of the House—as the necessary 
concurring officers.121 Proponents of this approach argue 
that it has three important advantages: political legitimacy, 
democratic input, and independence of the concurring 
individuals. The assent requirement from both officers would 
be applicable regardless of whether the action was proactive, 
preemptive, or in response to an attack. The two officials could 
veto the launch order if they determined the president to be 
mentally unstable or otherwise unfit. The purpose would be to 
provide a necessary safeguard regarding the order’s lawfulness 
because there may not be sufficient time to activate the 25th 
Amendment in these situations.122 
As the repeated actions of presidents of both political parties 
have demonstrated, the validity of the War Powers Resolution 
remains highly contested, and compliance has been incredibly 
inconsistent. Such volatility exemplifies the difficulty of 
evaluating the practical impacts of implementing any contested 
proposal for limiting unilateral presidential authority to initiate 
a nuclear strike. The possibility remains that adherence to the 
current policy will remain highly reliant on the ad hoc behavior 
of military officers who will be forced to determine whether 
a relayed presidential order is lawful. It is possible that the 
informal adjudication of the conflict presented between a 
presidential order and a congressional mandate will provide 
the requisite delay to permit consideration of the incapacity of 
the president and triggering Section 4 of the 25th Amendment. 
It is also important to consider concerns raised by many of 
the various proposals regarding implications for the deterrent 
value of the nuclear defense system123 and the debate about 
121  Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright & Steve Fetter, How to Limit Presidential 
Authority to Order the use of Nuclear Weapons, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS, Jan. 23, 2018. See also Forrester, supra note 110, at 1641 (“[R]
equire the President to receive the concurrence of at least one of the 
two [representatives of the House and Senate] in the President’s plan of 
action”).
122 Gronlund et al., supra note 121.
123 See, e.g., Goldstein, Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the 
Nuclear Age, supra note 101, at 1586 (“to adhere religiously to orthodox 
principles of congressional war declaration would be to render the entire 
nuclear defense deterrence system virtually worthless”); Authority to Order 
the Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 87 (remarks of Peter Feaver) (“You 
want to make sure that you don’t propose a legislative fix that undermines 
the nuclear deterrent and, thus, compromises the effectiveness of why we 
have nuclear weapons.”); id. (remarks of Gen. Kehler) (“it enhances our 
deterrence to have some doubt in the mind of an adversary about under 
what conditions we would use a nuclear weapon”).
command and control itself.124 However, absent a constitutional 
amendment, the respective postures of the executive and 
legislative branches make implementation of the prior four 
proposals unlikely. 
Proposal 4: Utilize Congressional Budgetary Powers 
to Mandate Closer Coordination with Defense 
Department on Nuclear Arsenal
Congress should utilize its budgetary powers to ensure 
increased consultation regarding nuclear arsenal plans. Given 
Congress’ contested authority to legislatively preclude the use 
of nuclear weapons or to mandate the assent of executive or 
congressional officials, the power of the purse is the optimal 
choice to ensure the implementation of desired checks and 
balances. Congress should, therefore, compel the Department 
of Defense to engage in frequent consultation with House 
and Senate leadership about the nation’s nuclear arsenal 
plans and require updates when there are any sudden or 
unplanned changes in the United States’ nuclear footing. Such 
consultation would further empower Congress to fund only 
those purchases or that maintenance it considers integral to 
national security and to force the attrition of those systems 
or stockpiles it believes to not be in the nation’s best interest. 
Congress could additionally mandate that the secretary of 
defense inform executive branch national security leadership, 
including the vice president and other principal officers of the 
executive departments on the National Security Council, when 
there is an unanticipated change in the nation’s nuclear footing. 
Such notification could result in those officials evaluating the 
initiation a Section 4 process under the 25th Amendment. 
This proposal would ensure that Congress (1) plays the proper 
role in outfitting and positioning nuclear weaponry and (2) 
contributes to a potential consensus around the need to 
activate Section 4. By avoiding the unresolved debate over the 
president’s war powers, this proposal presents the best option 
to provide immediate and meaningful protections against 
errant launches. 
124 See, e.g., Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 87 
(remarks of Sen. Rubio) (“[T]his is an important conversation, but one we 
should tread lightly on. Our allies who rely on U.S. defense assurances are 
watching, and if we create doubt in their minds about the capability or the 
willingness of the United States to live up to those commitments . . . it could 
have repercussions that are significant . . . I also think our adversaries are 
watching.”).
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V. Conclusion
More than half-a-century ago, the framers of the 25th 
Amendment made great strides in planning for the perils of 
an unable president. Today’s policymakers should continue 
to build on that legacy by working to ensure that it is possible 
to effectively invoke the amendment when needed and that 
there are additional checks placed on the president’s nuclear 
authorities for scenarios where invocation of the amendment 
is not practical.

